THE BIRMINGHAM COGNITION AND AFFECT PROJECT. То бишь проект Бирмингемского университета по изучению когнитивных и аффективных процессов. Коряво как-то перевел, даже самому страшно.
Там много чего интересного, а для затравки приведу краткие ответы одного из руководителей проекта на вопросы Кэррола Изарда, небезызвестного товарища в мире эмоций (буков много, поэтому под кат).
Клевый чувак =)
1. What is emotion?
The most general concept that fits our fuzzy and indeterminate mish-mash of uses of the words ’emotion’ and ’emotional’ is:A state in which a monitoring mechanism acquires a tendency (i.e. a disposition, possibly suppressed) to abort, redirect, or modulate some other process or collection of processes.
Example: a house-fly consuming food detects something rapidly descending towards it, and the ‘alarm’ mechanism aborts eating and triggers escape behaviour. In humans there is a far wider variety of cases involving evolutionarily older and newer mechanisms. E.g. a mathematician working on an important new proof notices the possibility of a fallacy caused by implicit division by zero. This may trigger a disposition to switch to investigating the offending step in the proof. Some of these disruptions can be unconscious — like the people who are jealous or infatuated and don’t realise it, though it is evident to their friends.In the obvious cases the tendency is not resisted and some change occurs as a result. In more subtle cases the disruptive tendency may be suppressed or overridden, but it is still there competing for control.
[ In 1996, Ian Wright, Luc Beaudoin and I published an analysis of long term grief, which is one of the most common examples of a state commonly labelled as an emotion which can endure over time, even while completely different emotions occur, e.g. enjoying a joke, concern about losing one’s job, falling in love, etc. Other examples of states that can endure while temporarily suppressed are jealousy, infatuation, anger, concern about one’s government’s actions, intense support for a political movement, joy at having a new baby, excitement about a research project, and, on a shorter time scale, excited anticipation of a forthcoming event. Theories of emotion that do not allow for the possibility of such phenomena must be false, unless their proponents hi-jack the label ’emotion’ by re-defining it to suit their theories. ]
(I personally think that ’emotion’ is not a concept that has sufficient precision/clarity/uniformity of usage, to be useful for scientists.
There are many phenomena that scientists need to investigate that get called ’emotions’ by various people. But the label just generates confusion and muddle.)
2. What’s the most important function (or effect) of emotion?
The main function of the mechanisms referred to above is to prevent ‘normal’ processing from continuing in circumstances where some state requiring (or prima-facie requiring) a change of ‘direction’ occurs.
[Other things that are labelled as ’emotions’ by other people, e.g. desires, concerns, attitudes, preferences, moods, pleasures, pains, etc. have other functions.]
3. What activates emotion?
Concurrently active mechanisms, namely
(a) those doing some task,
(b) those monitoring performance of (a) and the environment, using fast, trainable pattern-recognition mechanisms.
[Some of the monitoring mechanisms have to be fast in reacting to dangers and opportunities, so they will typically be fairly shallow, and they can produce both false positives and false negatives. Bad ‘training’ can lead to highly dysfunctional processes.]
4. How emotion is most effectively regulated?
Not sure what you mean. In my work I have talked about variable-threshold attention filters that suppress interruptions and disturbances, at least in part of the system. The filter threshold will depend on urgency, importance, and resource requirements of current tasks.
That’s an answer regarding regulation of initiation.Once emotional disruption has been initiated there are other kinds of regulation required, e.g. not over-reacting to accidental behaviour in a young child.
There’s also long term regulation which is part of learning — e.g. training the monitoring mechanisms.
5. What’s another question we should pose for discussion?
For a deep science of mind, covering humans, other animals, and robots, what sort of ontology of affective states and processes is needed?
[The ontology will be different for different sorts of animals and machines, and for humans at different stages of development, or with different kinds of brain damage or disease. A meta-ontology will show how different architectures support different mental ontologies.]
6. Are there rapid, automatic, and unconscious connections among emotion, cognition, and action?
(Also some slow, deliberate, and conscious connections, e.g. when people learn to detect and control their emotional reactions — which does not happen often enough I fear.)